clothcap (clothcap) wrote,
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Cameron's Coup In Libya

Background.
The Libyan intelligence service had aided the IRA in its struggle for a united Ireland free of UK oppression. For this, MI6 that was also involved in the IRA group had tried to assassinate Gaddafi several times using a CIA asset, Belhadj, an army deserter that formed the LIFG terrorist gang for the purpose.
Two false flags were blamed on the Libyans, Lockerbie and the shooting of PC Yvonne Joyce Fletcher. These were to enable a military response against Libya.
Cameron is/was allegedly an MI6 employee.
Gaddafi was leading the way to a united Africa with its own public owned central bank. The currency was to be a gold backed dinar. Oil was to be sold for gold. This threatened the dollar as the currency of exchange for oil. It also threatened the Rothschild headed cartel's central bank hegemony. Also the Fed Res desperately needed gold.
Goldman Sachs lost all of a very large investment of Libyan funds brokered by Blair. Sarkozy was said to be involved in the defrauding of Libya. Lawyers were pursuing compensation.
Sarkozy had taken kickbacks for the construction of nuke reactors. Documents proving this were held by the Libyans.
Libya is an oil and gas rich country.
The Libyan government had contained the human trafficking and drugs trade. The jewish mafia was/is deeply involved in both.
The Libyan government had completely suppressed Islamic terrorism. Terrorists were needed for the regime change proxy wars as documented by a US military manual.
The success of Libyan participatory democracy was a threat to the top to bottom corrupt Western representative democracy.
These are the main reasons for the illegal action by the central bank run nations of the West.
Side benefits were the abundance of children available for kidnapping and trafficking and an abundance of corpses for the illegal body parts trade that the jewish mafia was/is deeply involved in.
Bilderberg agreed to the contrivance of the "intervention" at a meeting before the famous pair of Libyan airforce deserters were touted as evidence that Gaddafi was bombing civilians. He was targetting a terrorist uprising, (likely pre-arranged). Cameron was aware of this.

I can't believe that this has been around for 2 years and no one has called NATO and (Bilderbergers) Cameron, Sarkozy, Berlusconi and Obama and to account.

"Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene"
Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
September 2013
Author: Alan Kuperman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2000–2001
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Quarterly Journal: International Security
This policy brief is based on "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," which appears in the Summer 2013 issue of International Security.
BOTTOM LINES
• The Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong. Libya's 2011 uprising was never peaceful, but instead was armed and violent from the start. Muammar al-Qaddafi did not target civilians or resort to indiscriminate force. Although inspired by humanitarian impulse, NATO's intervention did not aim mainly to protect civilians, but rather to overthrow Qaddafi's regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans.
• The Intervention Backfired. NATO's action magnified the conflict's duration about sixfold and its death toll at least sevenfold, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If Libya was a "model intervention," then it was a model of failure.
• Three Lessons. First, beware rebel propaganda that seeks intervention by falsely crying genocide. Second, avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels and thus endanger civilians, unless the state is already targeting noncombatants. Third, resist the tendency of humanitarian intervention to morph into regime change, which amplifies the risk to civilians.
A MODEL INTERVENTION?
Many commentators have praised NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in that country's second largest city, Benghazi, and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi. These proponents accordingly claim that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian principle known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). Indeed, the top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that "NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention." A more rigorous assessment, however, reveals that NATO's intervention backfired: it increased the duration of Libya's civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If this is a "model intervention," then it is a model of failure.
FLAWED NARRATIVE
The conventional account of Libya’s conflict and NATO’s intervention is misleading in several key aspects. First, contrary to Western media reports, Qaddafi did not initiate Libya’s violence by targeting
peaceful protesters. The United Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in mid-February 2011—Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata—violence was actually initiated by the protesters. The government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally targeted civilians or resorted to “indiscriminate” force, as Western media claimed. Early press accounts exaggerated the death toll by a factor of ten, citing “more than 2,000 deaths” in Benghazi during the initial days of the uprising, whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) later documented only 233 deaths across all of Libya in that period.
Further evidence that Qaddafi avoided targeting civilians comes from the Libyan city that was most consumed by the early fighting, Misurata. HRW reports that of the 949 people wounded there in the rebellion’s initial seven weeks, only 30 were women or children, meaning that Qaddafi’s forces focused narrowly on combatants. During that same period, only 257 people were killed among the city’s population of 400,000—a fraction less than 0.0006—providing additional proof that the government avoided using force indiscriminately. Moreover, Qaddafi did not perpetrate a “bloodbath” in any of the cities that his forces recaptured from rebels prior to NATO intervention—including Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya, and much of Misurata—so there was virtually no risk of such an outcome if he had been permitted to recapture the last rebel stronghold of Benghazi.
The conventional wisdom is also wrong in asserting that NATO’s main goal in Libya was to protect civilians. Evidence reveals that NATO’s primary aim was to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in retreat and others in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians.
Moreover, NATO continued to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and spared civilians. Such military assistance included weapons, training, and covert deployment of hundreds of troops from Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture and summarily execute Qaddafi and seize power in October 2011
.
THE INTERVENTION BACKFIRED
The biggest misconception about NATO’s intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths.
[C. From ppl I know and the reports that came through during the assault ]
The best development in postwar Libya was the democratic election of July 2012, which brought to office a moderate, secular coalition government—a stark change from Qaddafi’s four-decade dictatorship. Other developments, however, have been less encouraging. The victorious rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal killings and expelled 30,000 mostly black residents of Tawerga on grounds that some had been “mercenaries” for Qaddafi. HRW reported in 2012 that such abuses “appear to be so widespread and systematic that they may amount to crimes against humanity.”  Ironically, such racial or ethnic violence had never occurred in Qaddafi’s Libya.
Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent threat was highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Even more recently, in April 2013, a vehicle bomb destroyed half of the French embassy in the capital, Tripoli. In light of such insecurity, it is understandable that most Libyans responding to a postwar poll expressed nostalgia for a strong leader such as Qaddafi.
Among neighboring countries, Mali, which previously had been the region’s exceptional example of peace and democracy, has suffered the worst consequences from the intervention. After Qaddafi’s defeat, his ethnic Tuareg soldiers of Malian descent fled home and launched a rebellion in their country’s north, prompting the Malian army to overthrow the president. The rebellion soon was hijacked by local Islamist forces and al-Qaida, which together imposed sharia and declared the vast north an independent country. By December 2012, the northern half of Mali had become “the largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world,” according to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa. This chaos also spurred massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malian civilians, which Amnesty International characterized as “Mali’s worst human rights situation in 50 years.”
Sophisticated weapons from Qaddafi’s arsenal—including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012—leaked to radical Islamists throughout the region. NATO’s intervention on behalf of Libya’s rebels also encouraged Syria’s formerly peaceful protesters to switch to violence in mid-2011, in hopes of attracting a similar intervention. The resulting escalation in Syria magnified that country’s killing rate by tenfold.
Full brief belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23387/lessons_from_libya.html
PDF belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Kuperman%20policy%20brief%20published%20version%202.pdf

Even this brief doesn't tell the full truth but goes a lot further towards it than anything seen in the shameful MSM at any time.
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